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The Implications of Devastating Conditions 
in Refugee Camps on the European Migration 
Crisis
Th is paper provides a comprehensive overview of the devastating conditions in refugee 
camps in the Middle-East and their contribution to the European refugee crisis. Th e selec-
tion of case studies includes refugee camps in Lebanon, Turkey, and Jordan, which are the 
major host countries for Syrian refugees, since the civil war in Syria began in 2011. Every 
case is analyzed by factors of accommodation, nutrition, and health care. Furthermore, 
the funding requirements of these camps are also taken into consideration. While Turkey 
was able to handle the migration movements mainly from Syria much more effi  ciently 
than Lebanon and Jordan, the other countries were completely overwhelmed by the crisis 
and the international community did not provide suffi  cient funding in order to support 
these two states. Earlier anticipation of the crisis could have prevented the mass migration 
movement from Syria to Europe, which started mainly in 2015 and remains still one of the 
major issues in European policy. Th e fi ndings of this article show that providing proper 
accommodation, nutrition, and health care locally in the respective camps gives people 
incentives to stay in the region and not fl ee to Europe. In any case, a new development 
strategy for refugee camps in general is required.
1. Introduction
Europe has experienced decades of wars and the creation of the European Union brought the 
continent a period of peace and wealth. Now, in the year 2018, the EU is in a great crisis. Th e 
current migration crisis is probably the major issue to be addressed in coming years and the EU 
is struggling to fi nd a solution for this problem. Th e current crisis is an identity crisis for the 
entire EU. No other example than the current refugee crisis shows the discrepancy within the 
EU member states so obviously. On the one hand, there are states, which are willing to accept 
refugees like Germany or Sweden. On the other hand, there are states, which do not accept any 
refugee like the countries of the “Visegrad Group”.
Th e current state of science concerning migration theories mainly focuses on the classic push 
and pull theory by Lee (1966), which describes the factors: why people leave (push) their country 
and why people migrate to others (pull). Indeed, this model is still one of most important works 
in this fi eld and the basis for newer models, like ‘push-pull plus’ which introduces some other 
dimensions as well as identifying new drivers of migration. Furthermore, this article introduces 
works which have been dealing with the issue of refugees in camps and what impact devastating 
conditions have had on their lives. Nevertheless, the issue of refugee camps is only barely covered 
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by the literature. For that purpose, this paper provides its own ‘push-stay-pull’ model. Because 
refugee camps are an extraordinary situation, in these circumstances the ‘pull factor’ cannot be 
really applied here and going back to the area of origin is also not an option. 
Hence, this paper will analyze the situation of primarily Syrians in refugee camps and its 
implications in the European migration crisis and will emphasize the need for further research 
in this fi eld. Syria plays an undoubtedly extraordinary role in the current European refugee crisis 
since Syria is the country of origin for most immigrants (5.4 million people) fl eeing from war 
and 700,000 of them living in Germany. (BIM 2016) For that reason, the situation in refugee 
camps located in the neighborhood of Syria is relevant and will be analyzed by the example of the 
three primary countries hosting Syrian refugees: Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. All the refugee 
camps in these countries are permanently struggling with obtaining funding from the interna-
tional community. However, while Turkey is doing relatively well, the situation in Lebanon and 
Jordan remains devastating. As a consequence, these two countries suff er most from develop-
ment problems and cannot provide suffi  cient supplies to people in camps. Th e paper tries to pro-
vide an answer to this question: how does the devastating situation in refugee camps (including 
undernourishment, poverty, disease, etc.) aff ect the current European migration crisis? Th e aim 
of this paper is to analyze migration and refugee movements as a consequence of the miserable 
and inhuman conditions in refugee camps in the Middle-East and the subsequent impact on the 
European migration crisis beginning in 2015. Th is paper will mainly focus on the consequences 
of poverty and hunger, and the inadequate health care systems in refugee camps. Other migrati-
on drivers, like limited access to education will be also taken into consideration. Th e hypothesis 
of the paper is that people would not fl ee to Europe in signifi cant numbers if the situation in 
refugee camps in the Middle-East was reasonably livable. Th is article also pays attention to the 
counterargument that people without money cannot fl ee. In conclusion, the paper starts with 
the context part explaining the cases of the three top hosting countries, followed by a literature 
review, including an extended model for explaining the unique situation in migration theories. 
Th e last part of the paper is the discussion, which also tries to provide some recommendations 
and solutions for the devastating situation in refugee camps.
2. The Situation in Refugee Camps around Syria (Lebanon, 
Turkey & Jordan)
2.1 The Case of Lebanon
According to the UNHCR there are currently (2017) 1,001,051 registered Syrian refugees living 
in Lebanon. (UNHCR 2017) In comparison to the year 2015 with 1,150,000 Syrian refugees, the 
number has not signifi cantly decreased. (Amnesty International 2015) However, the real num-
ber is probably tremendously higher. For instance, SPIEGEL ONLINE reported in the year 2015 
that Lebanon is hosting approximately 2 million Syrian refugees in a country with a population 
of 4.5 million inhabitants. (Salloum 2015) Every fi ft h person in Lebanon is a refugee, which ma-
kes Lebanon, per capita, the biggest host country for refugees in the world. (Rainey 2015)
Th e state of Lebanon changed its migration policy in the year 2015. Since then, the UHNCR 
is not allowed to register any Syrian refugees. Th us, the Lebanese state is incapable of hosting 
such a huge amount of fl eeing people and to provide them suffi  cient food, water, health care, etc. 
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Th e UN reported as early as December 2015 that “some 70 per cent of the over 1 million Syrian 
refugees in Lebanon now live below the Lebanese extreme poverty line”. (UN 2015) Private orga-
nizations and institutions like Women Now or Sawa for Syria have assumed the role of the state 
and built their own refugee camps in Lebanon. (Molter 2016) Th ese organizations depend on 
donations, exactly the same as the UHNCR does. Despite worldwide fi nancial support, the fund-
ing of these help organizations is constantly wanting. For example, the UHNCR has only covered 
30% of its 2 billion USD funding requirements (November 2017). (UHNCR 2017) Furthermore, 
most of the refugee camps are not offi  cial camps, but only tolerated by the Lebanon state. Private 
owners of land are letting some of their ground for the establishment of refugee camps. Th e price 
for one family per month is usually 100 USD – just for the allowance to set up a tent. For a family, 
which has lost everything in war, this is a huge amount of money, and they still need nutrition 
and clean water. (Molter 2016)
Molter (2016) reported from Bekaa, where approximately 1 million Syrian refugees (tem-
porarily) live in refugee camps, that the camp administration is able to provide enough food 
and clean water. Nevertheless, the situation can change instantly and everything else is in peril. 
For instance, because of limited classroom capacity only 30% of 400,000 Syrian refugee child-
ren are able to attend school. Many children have to work in order to support their families 
fi nancially. Th erefore, child labor is pretty common, as is prostitution. Th e UHNCR can only 
provide 13 USD per month for one family and because of funding issues the trend is negative. 
Th us, the UN refugee organization is not really a big help. Many of the help organizations 
themselves are migrating to Turkey because the registration of their work is easier there. (Mol-
ter 2016)
Concerning health care, Lebanon did have proper infrastructure, including 165 hospitals, 158 
primary health care centers and well-educated employees in 2013. Overall, the basic health sys-
tem of Lebanon was functional, but also costly, before the crisis intensifi ed in 2015. Regardless, 
the more prevalent, chronic, non-communicable health care needs made the country struggle. 
Lebanon was already over allocated during that time since the country had to host Palestine 
refugees as well. One of major challenges is to provide long-term support, while aft er natural 
disasters only emergency help is required. (El-Khatib, Scales, Vearey & Forsberg 2013) Th us, Le-
banon was not able to fulfi ll all these requirements anymore, and, consequently, the outbreak of 
leishmaniasis occurred in 2012. Saroufi m (2014) concluded that “poverty, malnutrition, popu-
lation displacement, weakened immunity, and poor housing are all risk factors for cutaneous le-
ishmaniasis”. Additionally, Lebanon has a long tradition of distribution battles between refugees 
(mostly from Palestine) and the hosting community. According to Halabi (2004), the population 
in the camps competed for the scarce resources, including employment and housing. Palestinian 
traders did not have access to markets which surrounded the camp. Th e markets have been oc-
cupied mainly by Syrian traders and only outdated food products have been left  for Palestinians. 
Furthermore, the outbreak of other confl icts in the ‘60s, lead to greater struggle over housing. 
Th e consequence was the establishment of illegal camps creating structures with high confl ict 
potential. (Halabi 2004) Th is problem has never been solved and additionally shows some signi-
fi cant similarities to the current problems of refugee camps in Lebanon. Th e global community 
has already ignored the demand for help from Lebanon for decades, and by taking the under-
funding of refugee camps into consideration still does.
NEMZETKÖZI KAPCSOLATOK MULTIDISZCIPLINÁRIS DOKTORI ISKOLA 207
2.2 The Case of Turkey
Th e total amount of registered Syrian refugees living in Turkey is 3,285,533 in 2017. (UNHCR 
2017) In comparison to 2015 with 1.7 million Syrian refugees, the number of refugees has almost 
doubled. From the almost 2 million refugees in Turkey in 2015, 250,000 were living in one of the 
25 refugee camps (the rest are spread across the country). Th e WFP was able to provide food and 
clean water for 154,000 people in 11 camps.  (WFP 2015) According to the New York Times, in 
2014 the refugee camps in Turkey were in pretty good condition. Th e Turkish government built 
at record speed container camps with at least minimum standards, including cleanliness, brand 
new brick paths, street-washing trucks, power lines, streetlights, housing maintenance and play-
grounds for children. Furthermore, the camp in Kilis provided education for 2,225 students; 
sometimes at a higher standard than in the home school in Syria. (McClelland 2014) However, 
the situation outside the camps remained devastating. Many of the refugees were living on the 
streets or in shanties. In most cases, it is unknown where they lived. According to Onur Burçak 
Belli, a reporter from the FAZ and who observed the situation in Istanbul, Ankara, Adana and 
other Turkish cities, the standard of living for most Syrian refugees is much worse than in camps. 
She reported that children very oft en became the main income source for families. Indeed, child 
labor is not a new phenomenon in Turkey, but the level of exploitation was exceptional high 
since most Syrian children are traumatized and barely speak the Turkish language. Another is-
sue was the rising tension within society because of the extraordinary high level of immigrants. 
(Topçu 2015)
Th e reason for the relatively high standard in Turkish refugee camps is not due to the eff orts 
of the UNHCR, but due to Turkish state initiative. Th e Turkish government received guidelines 
(minimum distance between tents, etc.) from the UNHCR and then designed the camps on its 
own. Th is approach has the advantage that Turkey remains in control of every detail. Indeed, 
this procedure is cost-intensive, but also highly eff ective. While NGOs, who are usually running 
refugee camps, oft en have to deal with local bureaucracy, ineffi  cient structures (many countri-
es are involved) and insuffi  cient funding, a relatively wealthy state can fulfi ll the requirements 
easily. (McClelland 2014) Th e actual fi gures concerning the UNHCR funding requirements in 
2017 confi rm this observation. For the year 2017, the UNHCR requires funding of around about 
900 million USD for Turkey, which is not even half of the required funding for Lebanon, althou-
gh signifi cantly more refugees are living in Turkey than in Lebanon. Nevertheless, the UNHCR 
struggles to receive the necessary funds. At the moment (2017), the UNHCR only covers 37% of 
its funding requirements. (UNHCR 2017)
Prior to the current situation in Turkey, the Turkish government had anticipated the upco-
ming crisis much better than other countries and was respectively far better prepared. While 
Jordan or Lebanon have had to struggle with epidemics, diseases and other urgent health issues, 
Turkey managed to establish a well-functioning and highly-eff ective health care infrastructure in 
order to respond adequately to the mass migration from Syria. Indeed, the Turkish state is eco-
nomically much stronger when compared to Lebanon and Jordan. Th erefore, the funding was 
not such a big issue as in other countries. (Sahlool, Sankri-Tarbichi & Kherallah 2012)
Although, the Turkish state covers the basic needs of Syrian refugees in camps, there are, of 
course, also some criticisms like food poisoning, insuffi  cient distribution of basic goods (e.g. 
soap or toothpaste), tents are not protecting from rain, insults from Turkish soldiers, etc. In 
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general, Özden (2013) had the impression that wealthier Syrians prefer to live outside the camps 
by renting apartments, while the not so wealthy stay in the camps. As a consequence, especialy-
ly in Southern Turkey (close to the Syrian border) the costs of living and unemployment have 
increased which might lead to local confl icts between Syrians and Turks. (Cagaptay 2014) con-
sequently, many of the Syrians are living in extreme poverty or becoming homeless aft er running 
out of money in a short period of time. Nevertheless, in comparison to 2012, the Turkish govern-
ment has intensifi ed its cooperation with international help organization, involving FAO, IOM, 
UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, and UNICEF in order to provide more assistance for refugee living 
inside and outside the camps. (Kirişc 2014) Nevertheless, Turkey was overwhelmed of the infl ow 
of Syrian refugees. At the beginning of the crisis, almost all refugees lived in camps. By end of 
the year 2014, approximately 80 percent of Syrian refugees lived outside the camps, which shows 
that also the Turkish government had distribution struggles before the refugee crisis in Europe 
had broken out. İçduygu stresses that Turkey should not left  alone to solve the crisis but only 
sharing of the burden by the international community can signifi cantly improve the situation of 
Syrian refugees in Turkey. (İçduygu 2015)
2.3 The Case of Jordan
Jordan is the third country in this case study which is highly aff ected by refugee movements. 
According to the UNHCR, there are currently 654,877 Syrian refugees in Jordan.  (November 
2017) (UNHCR 2017) In comparison to the year 2015, the number of refugees (620,000; 84% in 
refugee camps) has slightly increased. (Francis 2015) Similar to Lebanon, the Jordan state fails to 
provide suffi  cient security for the immigrants. Even before the crisis in Syria, Jordan was strugg-
ling with massive economic and political instability. Th erefore, the situation has dramatically 
worsened since 2015. Th e Jordan state is not able to provide proper accommodation for refugees 
since most of the people are living actually not in camps, but rather in “host communities”.  Since 
2014, the Jordan government has highly restricted access to the country for Syrian refugees be-
cause the Hashemite Kingdom feared national instability due to the growing number of refugees 
and camps along the border with Syria. Th us, the tensions between the UNHCR and the Jordan 
regime have started to rise. Th e problematic situation in Jordan makes it diffi  cult for the UNHCR 
and other help organizations to improve the life of people in refugee camps. (Francis 2015)
Two years later, the dramatic situation in Jordan has not signifi cantly changed. Musharbash 
(2017) claims that help organizations have only limited access to the “improvised” camps and 
are still incapable of providing enough support. In comparison to Turkey and Lebanon, tens of 
thousands of people (mostly children and women) have no access to clean water and food. Furt-
hermore, terrorist attacks happen also regularly in the camps. Th ere has been no support from 
help organizations since 2016. Consequently, diseases and child mortality have spread through 
the camps because of the lack of health care. At the beginning of year, there has was some small 
success concerning these issues, but the UNHCR is still many kilometers away and most of the 
emergency supplies could not be delivered due to distribution problems and bad weather. In 
addition to domestic policy issues and bad infrastructure in Jordan, the insecure situation in the 
camps is a major issue. Jordan estimates that 10 percent of the populations in its refugee camps 
are militant groups, including the IS. Another issue is a border dispute between Jordan and Syria 
which makes it diffi  cult to determine which country the refugees are currently located in. (Mus-
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harbash 2017). UN offi  cials call this region “no-man’s-land”. Th e UNHCR funding requirement 
for 2017 is approximately 1.2 billion USD which is covered 42 percent. Th us, the coverage rate is, 
compared to Turkey and Lebanon, relatively high, but by taking the tremendously big problems 
of the country into consideration, it is still just a drop in the ocean. (UNHCR 2017)
Jordan has a long history of almost six decades with refugee camps since it is one of the ma-
jor host countries for Palestine refugees. Th e unclear political situation makes it diffi  cult, if not 
impossible, to implement a proper urbanization strategy for those camps. Nevertheless, due to 
the long hosting experience of the country, some of these camps have developed the character 
of small cities or towns. Indeed, many buildings, streets and housing opportunities have been 
improvised and do not provide proper accommodation, but there has been certainly some deve-
lopment of some basic infrastructure for inhabitants. (Tawil 2006)  However, the Syrian refugee 
crisis exceeded the fi nancial ability of Jordan to meet the requirements since Jordan was already 
incapable of managing the refugee movements from Palestine for decades. Th e Za’atari camp for 
instance, which is the biggest Jordanian refugee camp for Syrians, had already struggled in 2011 
to provide enough food, sanitation and water. Th e registration process of Syrian refugees takes 
months. (El-Khatib, Scales, Vearey & Forsberg 2013) As a consequence of these bad conditions, 
some refugees even went back to Syria, or are living now in other (unregistered) improvised 
tenant camps spread over the country – without any access to nutrition or water. (Achilli 2015)
3. Current State of Literature
In general, we can identify three dominant forms of migration: labor migrants, settler migrants, 
and refugees. Nevertheless, there are many other forms of migration, including family reunion, 
marriage migration, student migration, highly-skilled migration and brain drain, environmen-
tal and climate change migration, and human traffi  cking and sexual exploitation. (King 2012) 
Migration theory, as a science, has shift ed to an interdisciplinary fi eld of research, including the 
newest trends of globalization, economics, mobility, etc. Th e dominant analytical theme of re-
cent time periods is the framing of international migration as a transnational process. According 
to King, the two most infl uential works in this fi eld were Towards a Transnational Perspective 
on Migration (Glick Schiller et al. 1992) and Nations Unbound (Basch et al. 1994). Another im-
portant scholar is Portes (1999), who provides a substantial defi nition on transnationalism and 
migration ‘that take place on a recurrent basis across national borders and that require a regular 
and signifi cant commitment of time by participants... Th ese activities are not limited to econo-
mic enterprises [such as sending and receiving remittances or setting up a business ‘back home’], 
but include political, cultural and religious activities as well’.
Since it is not very likely that migration movements will stop in the future, there are some 
challenges to building a more comprehensive and reasonable theory concerning migration. Th e 
classic article from Lee (1966), which introduced the famous push-pull theory, is still one of the 
most sophisticated works in the fi eld of migration studies. In this model, push describes the caus-
es of fl ight, while pull examines the attractiveness of the destination by certain factors. Push fac-
tors are socio-economic (hunger, poverty, demographic issues, etc.), political (war, dictatorship, 
discrimination, etc.) and environmental (natural disasters, scarce resources, etc.) based. Th us, 
pull factors include the following aspects: economy (booming economy, higher income, social 
welfare-system, etc.), society (security, housing, education, etc.), demography (suffi  cient space, 
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social networks, infrastructure, etc.) and politics (freedom, rule of law, democracy, etc.). Howe-
ver, there are also some other thresholds and barriers which have to be passed before migration 
can occur between the country of origin and destination, such as (restrictive) immigration laws. 
Hence, by taking all the previously described factors into consideration, migration will very li-
kely occur, when the destination off ers signifi cantly more advantages than the country of origin. 
Arango (2004) asks the question the way other around: why do people stay in their country of 
origin?  According to the classical “push (why people leave an area) and pull (why people move 
to a particular area) factors”, he suggests adding another pair: retain and repel, which refl ects the 
social, family and cultural structures at micro- and meso-scales. (King 2012) 
Th e latest works in the fi eld of migration studies have extended the classic push-pull theory 
by identifying and adding new drivers of migration to the model. An example of this expansion 
is Nicholas Van Hear, Oliver Bakewell and Katy Long with their article “Push-pull plus: reconsi-
dering drivers of migration” (2017). According to the authors, migration fl ows can be unders-
tood by taking the following categories into consideration: predisposing (structural disparities 
between origin and destination on the bases of macro-political-economy), proximate (direct 
bearing eff ects on migration, e.g. down- or upturn in economic), precipitating (outbreak of war, 
natural disasters, collapse of social welfare systems, etc.) and mediating drivers (presence or ab-
sence of infrastructure, communication, information). Th e decision whether one person decides 
to leave or to stay depends on the combination and the actual importance of these factors. Th e 
complexity of this model is to distinguish and evaluate between important and less important 
circumstances. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that proximate and mediating drivers show 
greater potential for intervention than structural and precipitating spheres. Furthermore, the 
authors identifi ed some other dimensions of drivers, like locality (e.g. demographic or envi-
ronmental pressures), scale (diff erent social and geographical scales), duration or timeframe 
(diff erent timescales from sudden to acute to chronic), and depth or tractability (drivers on the 
surface of society and hidden drivers). Again, the combination of these drivers is crucial in de-
termining if migration happens or not. All these factors should not be considered in isolation, 
but rather in concert. (Van Hear, Bakewell, Long 2012 & 2017)
Overall, the push-pull theory is probably the most comprehensive approach in migration 
studies. However, the theory is focused more on permanent settlement, or long-term migration, 
while refugee camps are supposed to be a short-term solution. Indeed, Everett, who came up fi rst 
with this model, has included “obstacles for migration” in his theory, but he is not dealing with 
the issue of people who are forced to fl ee for serious reasons (e.g. war), - respectively people, who 
are pushed away from their country of origin – and are not able to overcome these obstacles in 
order to migrate to another country, nor can they go back to their country of origin. Th e pull fac-
tor does not exist here, since the only appealing reason for fl eeing is security. Of course, security 
is the major human demand, but, nevertheless, it does not satisfy any other basic human needs. 
Th erefore, the push factor remains tremendously high while security is the only pull factor; a fac-
tor, which should be not taken into consideration at all, if it is the only reason for leaving an area, 
since it is natural that no rational (civilian) person wants to risk its life in armed confl icts. In this 
case, people are locked in no-man’s-land, respectively in camps or transit zones. Consequently, 
people are just pushed farther, or in other words, people will continuously seek alternative living 
and survival situations. Th e theory is based on the thinking that people are migrating from one 
country to another, which is initially true. Nevertheless, the reality is that people are mostly 
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fl eeing from one country to camps or transit zones, which makes a big diff erence. While count-
ries are following migration policies and trying to control the in- and outfl ow of migrants and 
citizens, camps are improvised solutions, oft en run by international institutions. Furthermore, 
although camps are mainly outside of the country where the armed confl ict takes place, they are 
in fact small complex socio-microeconomics for themselves and oft en referred as “a state in a 
state”. In particular, the examples of refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan show that these states 
are completely overwhelmed by the big refugee movements from Syria and are not able to cont-
rol their borders anymore. Th us, local governments in these neighboring countries are incapable 
of dealing with this situation properly, while camps are developing their own infrastructure and 
identity. In fact, extended versions of the push and pull model are now considering more drivers 
of migration, but the issues remain the same. Th erefore, a more profound approach is required 
which considers short-term settlement, i.e., camps and transit zones, as an identifi able entity in 
the model. Additionally, this approach off ers new opportunities in spatial planning as a part of 
urbanization processes because it can transform short-term into long-term sustainable solutions 
by satisfying basic needs (nutrition, fresh water, security etc.) and making cultural, political, and 
economic participation for its inhabitants possible. Th erefore, the classic push-pull model could 
be added to by the factor “stay”, which is supposed to reduce the causes of fl ight. Th e following 
table illustrates this model:







Satisfaction of Basic Human Needs
Development Program / Urbanization Process






Area Country A Transit-zone / Refugee Camp Country B
Timeframe Long-term / 
Short-term
Temporary with the Outlook for long-term Long-term
Direction of 
Migration
→ With Obstacle ( ; →) 
→ Without Obstacle (→) 
Table 1: Push-Stay-Pull Model
Another approach by Kaufmann (2004) emphasizes the social structures of mobility and 
migration. Since the world has become highly connected as part of the globalization process, it 
is very likely that this trend will continue in the future. Kaufmann calls it “the notion of mobility 
capital or motility”.  Access to more mobility will increase the possibilities to travel, migrate, cir-
culate, and return. (King 2012) However, not everybody will benefi t from higher mobility. Mah-
ler and Pessar (2006) have pointed out in their work that there is a gap between men and women 
concerning migration. Th e reason for this is patriarchal family structures which oft en lead to the 
eff ect that men migrate, but women stay at home. Th e current European refugee crisis is a good 
example of that. While the men are going to Europe, women oft en stay in the home country until 
men receive asylum and get the opportunity to let their family follow through legal processes. 
Additionally, men and women oft en have diff erent reasons for migration. Th e last aspect is the 
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anthropological and cultural studies perspective. (Blunt 2007) Tony Fielding distinguishes in his 
studies between “stairway to heaven (migration as freedom, new beginnings, going places, op-
ting out etc.) and rootlessness and sadness (migration as exile, displacement, rupture, sacrifi ce, 
failure, etc.) migration.” (King 2012) Th e stairway to heaven migration is becoming more and 
more important in the EU.
Since the war in Syria started – and therefore the so called ‘European Refugee Crisis’ as a 
consequence of this confl ict– the attention of migration theories has also shift ed to this issue. 
In fact, the neighboring countries of Syria are still the countries which are most aff ected by 
asylum-seeker movements – and not Europe. Th us, this development is also refl ected in recent 
literature by taking the situation of people in refugee camps fl eeing from armed confl icts in Sy-
ria under consideration. According to Berti (2015), the critical areas of intervention in refugee 
camps include protection, shelter, health and education, and employment. Th ose factors have to 
be fulfi lled suffi  ciently in order to provide a proper standard of living to people. However, the 
situation is not only problematic for the people in refugee camps but is also a burden for the 
hosting country. Th e refugee crisis negatively aff ects social services and labor markets, housing, 
electricity, sanitation and water resources. Consequently, many poor countries suff er a fi scal de-
fi cit, international trade decreases and loss of tourism income. Overall, the whole infrastructure 
and welfare system (if one is existing) of a country are put under extreme pressure. Th ese econo-
mic and political tensions lead to social tensions within society since distribution battles become 
more common. Another result is cultural confl icts, especially between groups which support 
diff erent sides in the Syrian civil war. Th erefore, massive refugee movements lead economic, 
political, environmental and security (food, health care, rising confl icts) instability. (Berti 2015) 
Indeed, the debate concerning refugee camps is not new in the fi eld of academics. Crisp and 
Jacobsen have given already some mentionable-worthy input to the debate in 1998 by indenti-
fying constraints on implementing international standards in refugee camps. Th ese limitations 
are environmental constraints (inhabitable living space), social constraints (refugees usually 
settle down close to their ethnic, cultural and linguistic preferences), political constraints (the 
government has the fi nal decision over its refugee policy) and logistical and fi nancial constra-
ints (limited capacity and resources). Nevertheless, the authors argue that refugee camps are 
necessary to protect people from armed confl icts. Governments have to apply a more liberal 
asylum policy and humanitarian agencies like the UHNCR need more fi nancial support to pro-
vide the highest possible supply of nutrition, basic materials and security. (Crisp & Jacobsen 
1998) Regardless, even when all these requirements are fulfi lled, it is not very likely that camps 
will suddenly be abolished. Refugee camps are complex socio-economical structures which de-
velop their own urban infrastructure, character and identity. Th us, because of self-sustainability 
market towns will develop and refugees could refuse to go back to their country of origin by 
becoming permanent settlers. (De Montlocs & Kagwanja 2000)
Newer studies in this fi eld of research mainly focus on the mental health and education-al 
situation in camps. Th e work from Sirin and Sirin (2015) with the title “Th e Educational and 
Mental Health Needs of Syrian Refugee Children” stresses the especially terrible condi-tions 
for children in refugee camps. According to their study, Syrian refugee camps are at great risk 
for mental health problems which might aff ect their development negatively. Another issue is 
the ineffi  cient and insuffi  cient supply of high-quality education for these children. Both mental 
health care and education are essential parts of successful integration but the funding problems 
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in many host countries make it nearly impossible to meet these re-quirements. (Sirin & Sirin 
2015) Th e study from Paardekooper, de Jong and Hermanns (1999), who analyzed the situation 
of South Sudanese children in refugee camps in Northern Uganda came to a similar conclusion. 
Th e vast majority of South Sudanese refugee children showed depressive symptoms and behavi-
oral problems. In general, refugees more oft en have mental health issues compared to the host 
community and other groups of migrants. (Acarturk, Konuk, Cetinkaya, Senay, Sijbrandi, Cuij-
pers & Akter 2015) Th e Syrian civil war has demolished every health care system in the country 
and lead to the spread of infections and epidemics like poliomyelitis, measles, and cutaneous 
leishmaniasis – not only in Syria, but also in its neighbor countries (especially in camps), be-
cause of high vulnerability of the Syrian population during the crisis. (Sharara & Kanji 2014) 
Consequently, it is not very likely or reasonable that people would prefer to stay in areas where 
they are denied health care since the situation in most camps remains devastating. Th erefore, the 
push factors are increasing signifi cantly and people are more likely to leave.
According to Toole, MF, DTM&H, Nieburg, MD, MPH, Waldman, MD, MPH (1988), who 
investigated in their article “Th e Association Between Inadequate Rations, Undernutrition Preva-
lence, and Mortality in Refugee Camps: Case Studies of Refugee Populations in Eastern Th ailand, 
1979–1980, and Eastern Sudan, 1984–1985” the situation of Tigrayan refugees in Eastern Sudan 
and Cambodian refugees in Th ailand, stated out the importance of refugee camps in terms of 
nutrition supply. While the mortality rate for Cambodian refugees in camps has declined signifi -
cantly, the mortality rate for Tigrayan refugees in camps remained extraordinary high. Especially 
young children (less than fi ve years old) suff ered from undernourishment. Furthermore, inter-
national relief agencies failed to distribute a suffi  cient amount of food to starving people. Th us, 
the authors concluded that anticipation of refugee movements is necessary in order to procure 
and organize enough nutrition.
Th e aforementioned case studies emphasize the importance of satisfying basic human needs 
like health care, nutrition, education, etc. Additionally, the political, economical, cultural and 
environmental situations should be also taken into consideration when analyzing refugee mo-
vements from camps, specifi cally why people do not stay there. On the other hand, it shows that 
providing livable conditions to people in camps can improve their situation or even eliminate the 
push factors for leaving. In conclusion, we can say that devastating conditions in refugee camps 
signifi cantly increase the probability that people will continue to journey to other destinations. 
Th e “push-stay-pull” model implements a new dimension in the discussion and tries to provide a 
coherent approach to stop mass migration by making life for people in refugee camps reasonably 
livable in the long-run.
4. Discussion
Overall, the literature concerning migration theories does cover all relevant parts from forced 
migration to labor migration with the exception of the unusual situation in refugee camps.  Re-
fugee camps are relatively new phenomena which appeared in the time aft er the Second World 
War. Nevertheless, it is not really part of the discussion in the fi eld of migration theories. Th ere 
are almost no studies which analyze the process of urbanization from camps. Most of new rese-
arch in this fi eld focuses on health care (epidemics, diseases, post-traumatic consequences etc.). 
Th e war in Syria shows that millions of refugees are living outside their country of origin in 
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temporary accommodations and the hosting states fail to provide suffi  cient security, health care 
and nourishment. Th us, private help organizations and institutions are replacing the functions 
of the actual states. Refugee camps are complex small to medium-size socio-economic systems. 
Some would even argue refugee camps are even states within a state; or, taking the devastating 
situation for most of the people in those camps into consideration, the term “failed” state seems 
to be also very reasonable.  A very popular example for such a refugee camp is the Gaza Strip 
in the West Bank, which is, in name, part of the autonomous region of Palestine, but is, in fact, 
under the control of the Israeli state since Israel controls the movement of people, telecommu-
nication, water and energy supply. Without a doubt, the Middle-East confl ict is a very complex 
issue, and it will be not part of this paper, but it illustrates a possible development in the future of 
other refugee camps in the region, even when excluding the religious tensions of the Middle-East 
confl ict, when a state – or other higher authority – is incapable of providing enough support. 
Concerning refugee camps, there is a lack of literature in the fi eld of migration studies. Th us, 
there is further need for research in this minor fi eld regarding circumstances in which people 
prefer to stay in camps rather than fl eeing to Europe.
Th e importance of refugee camps is a factor in the current – and still not solved – European 
refugee crisis. Th e big migration movement from Syria and its neighbor countries started when 
the UNHCR and WFP were running out of money and were no longer able to provide enough 
food, clean water, and security to the people outside the camps. In an interview with Th e Guardi-
an newspaper in Britain, the UN high commissioner for refugees, Antonio Guterres, formulated 
it in this way: “Th e budgets cannot be compared with the growth in need. Our income in 2015 
will be around 10% less than in 2014. Th e global humanitarian community is not broken – as 
a whole they are more eff ective than ever before. But we are fi nancially broke.” (Th e Guardian 
2015) One of the major counter-arguments concerning this issue is that “the poorest of the poor” 
usually do not migrate due to a lack of (fi nancial) resources, which are obligatory for migration. 
(UNDP 2009) Indeed, there has been also some discussion in the fi eld of academics that deve-
lopment help may even have the contrary eff ect, since fi nancial support from development help 
is providing these resources. (de Haas 2010) However, when analyzing the European refugee 
crisis, the issue is much more complex. First of all, major studies in this fi eld are from 10 to 20 
years old. In the meanwhile, the world has signifi cantly changed. Nowadays, we live in the era of 
digitalization and, therefore, the forms of communication have transformed completely. Even in 
poor areas of the world, it is not rare for people to own mobile devices. When in 2015, Germany 
and other European countries opened their borders for asylum seekers, the message spread aro-
und the world even to the most outlying regions in the world. Th e incentive-eff ect of this mes-
sage should be not underestimated. Infrastructure and mobility have made big steps forward in 
recent years. Whereas, in the 1990’s and 2000’s travelling around the world was very costly, it is 
nowadays relatively aff ordable with the emergence of low-cost no-frills airlines. Th e bigger issue 
remains here: not if the “poor of the poorest” can make it to Europe, but rather if they can get the 
right legal status and pay human traffi  ckers to get them there. 
Th e last part is what it makes so diffi  cult and costly to reach their country of destination in 
Europe. Th e Dublin II agreement, which says people have to seek asylum in the country where 
they fi rst enter European soil, is one of the reasons why it is and was so expensive to come to 
Europe since most asylum seekers prefer to go to Northern Europe (Germany, Benelux, Scandi-
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navia, etc.). When in late-summer 2015, the Dublin II agreement became obsolete, this obstacle 
did not exist anymore.  
Nevertheless, the situation concerning Syria remains very special. Before the outbreak of 
the civil war, the majority of the population had a relatively comfortable life. Th us, the country 
should be not considered as one of the “poorest of the poor”. At the beginning of the civil war 
in 2011, most people might have had still the illusion that the war would end soon and did not 
intend to go to Europe. However, many people lost everything when they had to fl ee, but a signi-
fi cant number of people had some fi nancial resources. A survey from 2016 by the IAB found out 
that most of the refugees who came to Germany have been fi nancing their fl ight by savings (39%) 
and by selling goods and property (34%). Th e costs vary signifi cantly from the country of origin, 
but in general it was between 5.200 EUR (second half of year 2015) and 7.300 EUR (2013). (IAB 
2016) According to this study, we can say that the costs were not the biggest problem on the way 
to Europe. At the same time, it is also not enough money to have a reasonable life elsewhere, es-
pecially not in the region of crisis, since distribution battle and scarce resources are also an issue 
(if there is no supply, money alone does not cover basic human needs like access to nutrition, 
food and education). Th e limitation of the work is that we cannot measure how much savings 
have been kept aft er fl eeing to Europe. Furthermore, it is also worth to mention that the origin 
of the money is not always clear, like an inside report from the German news journal SPIEGEL 
ONLINE demonstrates. According to their report refugees sold organs (approximately 7.000 
EUR average) because of fi nancial problems. (Putz 2013) Th e amount of people, who did this in 
order to fl ee to Europe, remains unclear. Th us, further research is needed.
Th e case studies show that proper accommodation and suffi  cient supplies (like in Turkey) 
can weaken the crisis, if the funding requirements are fulfi lled effi  ciently and NGOs do not have 
to do the whole work alone. However, refugee camps in their current form are not a fi nal solu-
tion. Th erefore, a new approach is needed. Migration theories, especially in the fi eld of refugee 
camps have to focus more on the aspect of how to give people a perspective locally. Th us, huge 
investments are required in order to build up functional economics (including employment, 
trade, and infrastructure) and to transforms refugee camps into livable areas, which provide 
housing, nutrition, water, etc. However, this transformation process can be only successful, if the 
legal status of the people is reconsidered, whether by integrating them in the host country, or by 
giving them a newly created citizenship, and people get the opportunity to participate in the so-
ciety – politically and culturally. People need the right of self-determination about their lives and 
future. It is not very likely that people will ever integrate in a diff erent society or start building up 
a new identity if they have the impression that other institutions or states are making decisions 
concerning them. In this context, self-empowerment is a very important factor which should be 
not underestimated. Th us, refugee camps need to become self-sustaining systems which can be 
run, in the long term, independently from fi nancial help of international organizations, or other 
states.
Nevertheless, the work has some limitations. Th e whole European migration crisis is still a 
relatively new phenomenon and many numbers and fi gures are hard to evaluate because most of 
the countries are involved in armed confl icts, the propaganda machinery is running and none of 
these countries are democracies. Furthermore, the political situation can change overnight, like 
the example of Turkey and the failed coup from last year demonstrates. Th e recently published 
study about autocracy from Bertelsmann (2018) shows that not only Turkey, but also Lebanon 
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and Jordan, have left  the way of democratization. Indeed, there is also the possibility that the civil 
war in Syria, respectively a proxy war, might stop overnight, and refugees will start going back to 
their country of origin, but this option is not very realistic. Th e situation remains very fragile and 
it can become even worse, if even more countries get involved in this confl ict. Since most of the 
hosting countries have already reached their limits concerning hosting refugees, there is also the 
threat that distribution battles for the scarce resources will escalate and new confl icts between 
host community and refugees will emerge.
4.1 Possible Solutions and Recommendations
Th e role of refugee camps has to be reconsidered. Th e actual plan that refugee camps should be 
temporary solutions does not work anymore. Indeed, the case of Palestine refugees raises the 
question if it has ever worked suffi  ciently. Th e civil war in Syria started in 2011 and is still far 
from being resolved. Th us, the forced migration from this region needs to be stopped to give 
the refugees a local perspective. Refugee camps around Syria can be the solution if the world 
community is able to implement public assistance, create jobs and treat the camps as small mic-
ro-economies to allow them trade with other countries and regions. In order to achieve this goal, 
multinational enterprises could start investing in this region by building plants, and to provide 
jobs to the local community. Tax reduction and a low-tariff  policy for trading goods could be 
incentives to bring investors into the region. Since the sun in all of the investigated countries 
is shining most of the time, this area is very attractive for producers of regenerative energy by 
building solar power plants.
Furthermore, the world is at the edge of a new industrial revolution. Digitalization will chan-
ge our understanding of work and labor signifi cantly. According to the Oxford study “Th e Fu-
ture of Employment: how susceptible are jobs to computerization?” (Frey & Osborne 2013) by 
the year 2030, 50 percent of present jobs will vanish. An unconditional minimum income for 
everybody in the world is the only possible solution to treat that problem. Th e common fear of 
digitalization is that people will be replaced by machines and algorithms. However, this point 
of view undermines the great possibilities of digitalization. Th ere are plenty of jobs, which will 
be, without a doubt, not missed; those jobs nobody really likes to do. Th e digitalization process 
is the opportunity to get rid of those jobs, and to free certain parts of society from unnecessary 
labor. Th e perspective has to change. Instead of thinking that robots are replacing humans and 
only the owners of those machines are benefi ting from this change, we have to restructure the 
organization of our economy and the distribution of wealth. Hence, the digitalization process is a 
great opportunity for the poorest people of the globe, if it is done in the right way – at least in the 
long-run. Th us, an unconditional minimum income could be contributed to every refugee in the 
world, and if it is high enough, people might stay in their region and start building up a perspec-
tive in their home country, or host country. Otherwise, the brain drain eff ect from the poorest 
regions in the world will never be stopped. Indeed, well-educated people are needed in order to 
establish a functional infrastructure and economy. It is not desirable to bleed the Middle-East 
completely out by absorbing all young talented people to Europe while the rest are left  behind.
In any case, a more realistic scenario for the near future is to provide more funding for the 
crisis regions. For instance, Germany, which was one of countries who took the most refugees 
in Europe, plans to increase its military expenditures by almost 50 percent in the next years (30 
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billion USD). Th is means, instead of investing in its defense, which is a very controversial topic 
within the German society, Germany alone could provide six times the funding for the refugee 
camps in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. Consequently, the fi nancial resources to solve the Eu-
ropean refugee crisis already exist (without even talking about progressive taxation, or taxation 
fi nancial transactions etc.), but they are just allocated in the wrong way or ineffi  ciently.
5. Conclusion
Th e European migration crisis can be only solved locally – in Syria and its neighbor countries. 
Hence, a completely diff erent policy is necessary since it is not very likely that the civil war 
in Syria will end soon. Th e diff erent case studies (Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan) show that refugee 
camps could be a possible solution, if done correctly. People need a vision of future hope and 
security in this region. Th en, the probability is very high that they would decide to stay and not 
make the decision to fl ee to Europe. In order to accomplish this goal, refugee camps need more 
autonomous rights since most of the NGOs in the region fail to provide suffi  cient supplies of 
food, medicine and other necessities. Additionally, the funding of the NGOs has to be improved 
as well as making their infrastructures faster and more effi  cient. While the Turkish government 
has done a good job concerning the migration issue by establishing proper accommodation in 
form of camps, Jordan and Lebanon failed because of highly limited resources.
Another factor is that the wealthy states have to share something from their wealth in order 
to support the crisis region. Agreements like the 2016 Turkey deal or deals with other authori-
tarian regimes in the Middle-East and Africa, are very risky because the political and economic 
situation in these countries can change instantly. All in all, crisis management was a complete 
failure and it could have been easily avoided by undertaking the right measures; a more reaso-
nable and comprehensive policy concerning the European migration crisis is required, especially 
providing a long-term strategy. Th e improvement of living conditions in refugee camps around 
Syria is one possible approach.
In conclusion, the European refugee crisis beginning in 2015 could have been avoided by 
earlier anticipation of the global community. Th e devastating conditions in refugee camps sur-
rounding Syria were very well-know, but the cries for help were mostly ignored. To this day, the 
UNHCR is begging for funding, the amount of which is very moderate compared to the con-
sequences of new possible mass migration movements from the Middle-East region to Europe. 
Indeed, funding is not everything, but the basis for every other improvement. Th e international 
community, especially Europe, which is mainly aff ected by refugee movements from the Middle 
East, have to start providing guidance and assistance in order to give people a perspective locally. 
Th is can be done, even taking soft  factors like the human need for education, culture or politi-
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